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Abstract 
Abstract 
Liberalisation of temporary contracts has become an important component of recent labour 
reforms but up to now available research has not paid attention to the impacts of these 
institutional changes on functional income distribution. The present paper intends to fill this 
gap by focussing on the reduction in strictness of employment protection of temporary jobs 
and analysing its effects on factor shares. 
We have estimated labour share, as well as its components, worker pays and 
employment, by considering country-sector evidence for 14 EU economies and the sample 
period 1995-2007. We have found that these legislative changes, that have favoured the 
extensive use of temporary contracts, have contributed to instability of working conditions 
and caused negative effects on workers’ pays. These impacts have more than 
counterbalanced the scanty positive effects on employment (due to greater access to the 
labour market of additional workers, likely young and women), thus leading to a decrease in 
income share accruing to workers. 
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1. Motivation1 
 
The slowdown of the labour share recorded in industrial countries from the early 
1980s up to the present has spurred a resurgence of interest in the functional distribution of 
income and has led many economists to reconsider the role of several factors such as 
globalization, the ICT revolution, product and labour market institutions. However 
theoretical models and empirical analyses have been less careful to explain the role of 
important deregulations represented by transition from regular toward unstable and 
precarious jobs in many European economies.  
Indeed, substantial liberalisations of labour markets have been recorded since he mid 
1990s, following the key recommendations of the 1994 OECD Jobs Strategy, in particular 
in terms of new regulatory frameworks to liberalise the utilisation of temporary contracts. 
As a result, extensive use of temporary contacts has been one distinctive  characteristic of 
European labour markets, and “today nearly 14% of  of EU employees work on contracts of 
limited duration.” (Salvatori, 2012, p. 944) What is still unexplored, however, is how these 
reforms, leading to enduring skill deficits and job instability, have influenced the functional 
distribution of income, thus failing to contrast the declined trends in labour share recorded 
in previous decades. The major motivation of the present paper is filling this gap.  
Notice also that the empirical work on the functional distribution of income “is rather 
meagre” (Azmat, Mannning and Van Reenen (2012, p. 1) and the few available studies are 
based on aggregate data. The limitation of these works is that the effects of labour policies, 
defined at the aggregate level, may be obscured by confounding factors that influence cross-
country variations. The present paper intends to circumvent these additional limitations by 
understanding changes at country-sectoral level. Indeed, by applying a shift and share 
analysis we ascertain whether the declining trends of labour shares (LS) are due to genuine 
wage moderation tendencies within sectors or simply to the relative decline in  high wage 
share sectors, and the parallel growing importance of low wage sectors, i.e. to a 
‘compositional bias’. (De Serres et al. 2001) 
Our observation period starts from the mid nineties when significant intra-Europe 
cross-country diversities arise, as shown by a number of studies (among others van Ark, et. 
al. 2008) and we take a closer look at the EU economies to distributive matters. We also use 
a difference-in-difference approach and estimate the influence of country institutional 
variables by controlling for industry effects. This estimation strategy allows us to verify 
whether changes in labour legislation of temporary contracts have caused significant effects 
on LS, especially in those sectors where the propensity to use temporary contracts is higher. 
In addition, we analyse the channels through which LS changes occur with separate 
estimates of employment and wages movements, the two components of LS. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1The authors thank, for their helpful comments, the discussant and participants in the 12th Bi-annual 
Conference of the European Association for Comparative Economic Studies – EACES, Glasgow, 6-7 
September 2012. 
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The results of our research show the significant negative role of liberalisation for 
temporary workers that have played an autonomous influence, additional to compositional 
bias. We provide further support for a thorough evaluation of policy interventions in a phase 
in which in many European countries new measures for growth and job creation are called 
for (European Commission, 2011). In addition, we can plausibly deduce from our results 
that welfare enhancing policy packages that contrast precarious work arrangements may 
contribute to break the declining trends of labour share. This is particularly relevant for a 
‘wage-led demand regime’, typically represented by the Euro area, as noticeably shown by 
the post Kaleckian model of Stockhammer et al. (2009)2. For this area, functional income 
distribution adverse to labour has substantial negative effects on aggregate demand. Thus, 
policy reforms that contrast precariousness of working conditions, far from being 
productivity-depressing (Damiani, Pompei and Ricci 2011), may be managed to sustain 
demand and growth simultaneously. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the related literature on 
functional income distribution. Section 3 discusses the conceptual framework behind our 
empirical strategy. Section 4 presents data and sources and offers some descriptive statistics 
and estimates. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Related literature 
The functional distribution of income is a central issue for classical economists and as 
Ricardo assessed “to determine the laws which regulate this distribution is the principal 
problem in Political Economy” (Ricardo, 1911 [1817], p. 1 in 1911 edition).  
However, the evolution of factor shares has been considered as being characterised by 
the constancy of factor share and generations of economists shared a motivated increasing 
disinterest in functional distributive matters, and “at least since the 1960s, factor shares 
have been downplayed” (Atkinson, 2009, p.4). The rationalisation given by the growth 
economic theory was that real wage and productivity increase at the same rate, while the 
sum of employment and productivity growth determines the growth of output. Under these 
conditions, the stability of the labour share was easily obtained and depicted as one of the 
main regularities of growth (Kaldor, 1961). 
In a different perspective, neoclassical economists offered their basic model based on 
the Cobb Douglas production function (characterised by a unitary elasticity of substitution 
between capital and labour) and showed that the additional assumption of competitive 
markets was sufficient to deliver the constancy of factor shares, regardless of changes in the 
capital-labour ratio and technological progress (see, among others, the contribution of Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin, 1995).  
However, as time progressed, a considerable variation of factor shares motivated a 
revival of interest in distributional issues. Since, the end of seventies, a marked decline 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See also the contribution of Charpe and Kühn (2012) who show in a DSGE model that a fall in workers 
bargaining power and adverse affects to labour income lead to lower aggregate demand, lower 
employment and output. 
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characterised the average share of labour of 14 European OECD countries and Japan, and  
as Glyn pointed out in a chapter of The Oxford Handbook of Income Inequality (2009), 
“after rising steeply in preceding years, the series peaks in 1976 and then falls almost 
continuously up to present.” (Glyn, 2009, p. 113) 
The interest in causes of the fall of labour share have encouraged several theoretical 
contributions but up to now the majority of empirical literature on changes in inequalities 
addresses personal distribution of income, even if “functional share research is just 
beginning a new resurgence” (Salverda, Nolan and Smeeding, 2009b).3 However, 
redistribution from profits to wages has a significant role in raising personal income 
inequalities, as found for an ample sample of developed and developing countries by 
Daudey and García-Peñalosa (2007)4, and these kinds of ‘junctures’ (between personal and 
functional distribution) appear ‘promising avenues of research’ (Atkinson, 2009, p. 15). 
Recent empirical papers have renewed interest in factor shares (Bentolila and Saint 
Paul, 2003; Gollin, 2002; De Serres et al. 2001) and such international organizations as IMF 
(Guscina, 2006, IMF, 2007, chapter 5, Jaumotte and Tytell, 2007), the European 
Commission (2008, ch. 5; Arpaia et al. 2009) and the Bank of International Settlements 
(Ellis and Smith, 2007) have tried to identify the main factors behind movements in the 
labour share. Two main driving forces have been signalled as being globalisation and 
technological changes, and a common factor behind these forces: deterioration of labour 
power. 
Certainly, openness to trade, consistent with the prediction of the Heckscher-Ohlin 
model, has led capital- rich countries to specialise in the production of capital intensive 
goods, thus causing a decline in labour shares, as shown by Guscina for a sample of 18 
countries over the period 1960-2000. These shifts have been amplified by capital mobility 
which has decreased the bargaining power of labour, the less mobile factor, and thereby its 
share of national output (Jayadev, 2007). Additional channels of globalization of labour 
represented by off shoring and immigration have exerted downward pressures on European 
labour shares (IMF, 2007), whereas larger FDI flows and the degree of capital account 
openness have contributed to the erosion of these shares (Harrison, 2002). However, this 
field of research offers explanations that reveal insufficient. For instance, it has been found 
that a percentage point increase in the trade-to-GDP ratio determines a fall of compensation 
and employment share by only 0.14 and 0.17 percentage points, respectively (Guscina, 
2006). In addition, the evolution of labour share observed in various industries also involves 
non traded sectors, but for these sectors the declining trends cannot easily be explained by 
globalisation. Other institutional variables appear behind these movements, for instance 
privatisation processes, the main driving force behind shifts in network industries (Azmat, 
Manning and Van Reenen, 2012).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The authors are the editors of  mentioned Oxford Handbook of Income Inequality, mentioned above. 
4 Daudey and García-Peñalosa examine 39 countries and prove on the basis of cross-country and panel 
evidence that smaller labour share are associated to greater inequality, thus obtaining that the factor 
distribution of income is an essential determinant of the personal distribution of income. 
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The neoclassical theory of distribution has been, in any case, the dominant approach 
but technological factors alone cannot reproduce the labour share movements of European 
economies. Indeed, in dominant neoclassical models relative factor prices are dependent on 
factor proportions (the capital/labour ratio) and characteristics of the production function. 
However, even relaxing the condition of a unitary elasticity of substitution between factors 
(which predicts unrealistic stable factors shares) it is difficult to explain actual declining 
changes observed over time. This is clearly shown by Blanchard (2000) who simulated (for 
Continental Europe and fifteen years) two different cases, featuring an elasticity of 
substitution between factors lower and higher than one, and for each case he found that only 
a limited fraction of labour shares might be explained by technological determinants (no 
more than 40%)5.  
Additional determinants of factor shares may be represented by striking technological 
changes that have affected IT- related goods,  improved the quality of monitoring  worker 
effort (Bental and Demougin, 2010) and reduced the (endogenous) bargaining power of 
labour6. With respect to neo-classical interpretations, these studies focus on the interactions 
between changes in labour market institutions and technology. This is the main perspective 
of Caballero and Hammour (1998), who intend to explain European capital-labour relations 
during the last three decades. The authors present a model featuring in the short run a putty-
clay technology and quasi fixed capital which give workers strong bargaining power and 
allow them an appropriation of firm specific rents; in the long run, on the contrary, the 
supply of capital is much more elastic and it permits a substitution away from labour to 
thwart appropriation from workers. However, as pointed out by Giammarioli et al. (2002, 
p.13) “The are two problems with this approach. Firstly, the authors do not consider at all 
the fundamental role of the deep reforms in labour market institutions that occurred in most 
of the European countries in the 1980s… Secondly, their argument is based on the existence 
of a high long-run elasticity of substitution between capital and labour, which seems in 
contrast to most of the available empirical evidence.” 
Other studies have found that new technologies tend to complement high-skilled 
workers, but substitute low-skilled types, as estimated by Arpaia et al. (2009) and by the 
European Commission (2008) and these substitution effects “are at the heart of a clear 
understanding of the direction in which a change in an economic variable affects the labour 
income share.” (European Commission, 2008, p.260) 
However, labor-augmenting technical progress and capital-high skill complementarity 
have to be considered with other sources of variation of the labour share which may account 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	   Another criticism has been arisen by Rowthorn (1999), who has estimated that the more 
realistic value of the elasticity of substitution is lower than one, thus requiring a decrease of the 
capital-ratio to explain the falling trend of the labour share occurred from the mid-1980s. 
However this decrease has never been confirmed by actual data, at least for European 
economies (see also EU Commission, 2007).	  
6 Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2007) propose a’ technology-policy interaction’ and show that 
“in the context of a labor market with frictions, a capital-embodied technological acceleration 
may reduce firms’ incentives to create new jobs, increase unemployment and reduce the labour 
share”. (p. 1089) 
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for the existence of a wedge between the real wage and the marginal product of labor, as 
shown in some other influential studies (Blanchard, 1997; 1998; Bentolila and Saint Paul, 
2003). These authors prove that under (very restrictive) competitive conditions and a 
production function with constant returns to scale, “movements in the labor share can be 
fruitfully decomposed into movements along a technology-determined curve, namely the 
share capital (SK) curve” (Bentolila and Saint Paul, 2003, p. 25). However, they admit that 
the predictive power of this relation is rather limited, since in more general conditions, i.e. in 
environments featuring product and labour market imperfections, equilibrium values of the 
labour share may move anti-cyclically7 and lie outside the SK schedule, as confirmed by their 
estimates. In this perspective, not only regulation of markets that influence changes in mark-
ups, but also union bargaining power and adjustment costs play a central role on functional 
distribution of income. In sum, the importance of labour institutions, in economies where 
persistent deviations from ‘ideal’ competitive conditions are pervasive, may be not keep out 
from the picture even in neoclassical models. However this kind of contributions shares the 
common view that only far-reaching labour deregulation may contrast bad employment 
performances and unfavourable conditions for labour income distribution. As we will see 
below, our evidence is less clear-cut. 
 
3. The conceptual framework of empirical analysis  
The main institutional determinants of labour share (LS) may be introduced into a 
reduced-form equation that is consistent with the by now standard price/ wage-setting of 
Layard et al. (1991). In this model, characterised by non competitive product and labour 
markets, institutions influence wages and employment levels, thus becoming a significant 
determinant of the functional distribution of income. 
In this price/wage-setting, where firms choose their price strategy and where workers 
bargain over their wage rates, there is not a direct one-for-one relationship between the 
share of value added accruing to labour and the capital-output ratio. Indeed, a mark-up of 
price over marginal cost is charged by each firm, usually conditioned by regulations that 
limit product market competition. In terms of remunerations, the bargaining power of 
unions led to a wedge between the negotiated wage and the reservation value. In this 
context, wages and employment (the two components of the numerator of the labour share) 
are the outcome of maximizing behaviour of non competitive firms and of unionized 
workforce (Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2003).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7Bentolila and Saint Paul (2003) assume constant returns to scale and labour embodied technical 
progress; in their model the production function is Y=F(BL, K), that can rewritten as Y=Kf( 
BL/K)=Kf(l) where l=BL/K. Under imperfect competition, there is a mark-up µ on marginal 
costs (given by the real wage rate w). Then the first order condition for profit maximization 
equates gives: Bf’(l)=µ w  and one obtains the labour share LS=[ l f’(l)(l)]/ µ, where the term in 
square brackets is the elasticity of labour demand to the real wage η; hence the labour share 
simplifies as LS= η/ µ. Pro-cyclical variations of mark-up cause anti-cyclical shifts of  labour 
shares. In addition, under EPL, LS may move counter-cyclically, as shown in Kessing (2003), 
Bentolila and Saint Paul (2003), Bentolila and Bertola, (1990).	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The underlying suggestion of this approach is that three main factors may influence 
factor shares: i) employment protection that causes adjustment costs (and a wedge between 
the marginal revenue product of labour and the wage rate); ii) unionisation and collective 
labour relations that affect wage setting in the labour market; iii) changes in mark-ups and 
in product market regulation that influence rents in the goods market. 
 
Employment protection of labour  
The evolution of labour shares may be conditioned by employment protection of 
labour (EPL), i.e. to norms for permanent contracts (EPLR) and for temporary contracts 
(EPLT) 8. Let us start by considering the expected results associated with changes in 
protection of temporary workers (EPLT), which is the main focus of our analysis.  
It is likely that low protection of temporary positions causes coordination and 
opportunity costs, as implicitly suggested by the vast new literature on personnel 
economics, aimed at exploring the “black box” of Human Resource (HR) practices and their 
functioning inside the firm (Michie and Sheehan, 2003, 2005). This literature emphasises 
that good practices include, among others, “employment security policies and labor-
management communication procedures”, as pointed out in the rich overview provided by 
Ichniowsky and Shaw (2003, p. 156). In particular, the ‘opportunity cost’ of temporary 
contracts is greater during intense periods of technological and organizational changes. 
Indeed, as found by Bresnahan,	  Brynjolfsson,	  and	  Hitt	  (2002),	  there	  is	  evidence	  that	  “IT 
are complementary to broader job responsibilities for line workers, more decentralised 
decision making, and more self-managing teams.”(p.339) Thus, the adoption of 
informational technologies (IT) and decentralized (holistic) forms of workplace 
organization (including self-managed teams, multi-tasking and delegation of decision 
rights) largely contributes to give increasing importance to human capital motivation and 
cooperative behaviour. Notice also that the need of continuous skill upgrading, cooperation 
and commitment requires, on its turn, training investment, job stability and best practices of 
management that are typically negatively correlated with the use of fixed term contracts. 
This is a promising avenue of research whose relevance to explain functional distribution of 
income is still unexplored. From this field, it is predictable that HR inferior strategies 
narrowly oriented only to cost minimisation in the short-term and to higher degree of 
functional flexibility, through opening of precarious positions, are conducive to high 
opportunity and coordination costs, low rewards and, thorough these channels, low LS9. 
This is an important rationalisation of positive adjustment costs, that cause a wedge 
between real wage and marginal product of labour. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 For the role of other institutions, such as active labour market policies, unemployment benefits, 
minimum wages, labour tax wedges, out of the scope of the present paper, see the European Commission 
(2008).  
9	  The reasons behind the adoption of these inferior practices may be due, as found by Bloom and Van 
Reenen (2007) to low competition that allows poor practices to persist and to the absence of a proper 
selection of management, especially in case of family firms. An additional explanation  is  that offered by 
new studies on behavioural economics that focus on myopic choices and short-termism (Laverty, 1996). 	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For remuneration, strong negative effects caused by lower EPLT are conceivable. 
Indeed, employment protection of temporary workers affects human capital accumulation 
and productivity and the bargained wage. Especially in environments where training cannot 
be contracted between firms and workers because of the unverifiable and unenforceable 
nature of firm-specific human capital investments, low EPLT disincentivate employees to 
invest in firm-specific human capital by decreasing the probability of the survival of the 
matching of employees and employers (Arulampalam, Booth and Bryan, 2004). This result 
is relevant in all contexts where risk-averse employees are liquidity-constrained and cannot 
obtain insurance against dismissals (Belot, Boone and van Ours, 2007). It means that 
workers with low protection, as those occupied with fixed terms contracts, receive less 
training and are less well-paid (Bassanini et al., 2007); and these temporary occupations, as 
found by Booth,  Francesconi and Frank (2002) for the UK, rather than be ‘stepping stones’ 
to permanent employment in good jobs, reveal to be ‘dead end’ jobs, characterised by poor 
pay and poor prospects. One related implication is that “the expected wage should persist 
through the individuals’ careers.” (Booth, Francesconi and Frank, 2002, p. F189 and 192)  
The effect of EPLT on employment outcomes, are expected to be ambiguous. On one 
hand, it may be advocated the implicit trade-off caused by liberalisation of temporary 
contracts between efficiency (negative) growth and employment (positive) growth; indeed 
fixed term contracts may have caused the European process of shifting toward higher 
employment levels, even if accompanied by lower average productivity increases (Dew-
Becker and Gordon, 2008). On the other hand, it can be argued, following Blanchard and 
Landier (2002), that deregulation of temporary contracts may merely increase the turnover 
in the labour market, rather than being “stepping stones” to permanent jobs, since this last 
type of job remains costly to dissolve due to the presence of high restrictions on dismissals. 
The main effect of labour reforms at ‘the margin’ is higher, not lower, unemployment. 
To summarise, in terms of final outcomes, in case of lower EPLT we expect stronger 
negative effects on wages (that are conducive to a reduction in labour share) and uncertain 
effects on employment. 
Our estimates also control for norms that protect regular workers. It has been 
formalised that EPLR protects jobs at times of declining demand but because employers 
refrain from firing in downturns they also refrain from hirings in upturns, and hence the 
overall effect on employment is ambiguous, as theoretically shown by Bertola (2009).  
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that also expected effects on wages are uncertain. As 
shown by the ‘insider-outsider’ literature, EPLR afforded to currently employed workers 
enhances their bargaining power and entails more favourable wage negotiations (Bertola, 
1999). However, an alternative interpretation, consistent with the ‘implicit contract theory’, 
such as the model proposed by Gomme and Greenwood (1995), is that EPLR provides job 
security and a sort of insurance contract between workers and firms, where the insurance 
premium, against the risk of dismissals, is paid in terms of lower pays. This is an 
interpretation not too distant from actual experiences of European economies where recent 
years have seen considerable wage restraint (OECD, 2004, ch. 3; European Commission, 
9	  
	  
2011); for instance over the period 2000-2004, wage increases in the EU25 (+1,0%) have 
been well below the rates of productivity growth (+2 %) and all evidence confirms, as 
signaled by the 2010 Report on Industrial Relations in Europe:  
“a widespread practice of wage moderation in which real wage growth is kept below 
productivity growth. Wage moderation has been a consistent feature of wage setting 
in the past two decades...One manifestation has been the continuous decline of the 
labour’ s share of total income in the EU.” (p. 127) 
 
A topic further explored below. 
 
Union bargaining power  
The wage-profit split is crucially caused by country wage setting systems and the 
bargaining practices of European countries are usually those formalised by the ‘right to 
manage’ scheme (Layard et al. 2001), where firms and unions bargain over wages and then 
firms set employment unilaterally, taking wages as given10.  
The explicit solution for the wage rate, in a generalised Nash bargaining, gives that an 
increase in the union bargaining power shifts the ‘wage rule’ (the combinations of wage 
rates and employment achieved in the labour market) upwards, with unequivocal negative 
effects on employment (see Appendix A.2.). In addition, the wage solution is dependent on 
union preferences. For instance, for a union utility function (V), with the Stone-Geary 
functional form (Oswald, 1985), one has: 
V= (w-r)δ (L-z)λ 
where r and z are minimum or references values of wages (w) and employment (L), while δ 
and λ give their relative importance to the union. This functional form has the advantage of 
nesting as special cases specific assumptions on union preferences11 and allows to obtain 
that increases of δ and λ (the respective weights of remunerations and employment in union 
preferences) cause opposite effects on bargained pays: when λ is higher, union wage claims 
are more moderate, under the constraint of labour demand (Manning, 1990).  
Empirically, the existence of a robust association between union density and wage 
restraint might be interpreted as a likely effect of more concern for employment stability, as 
we will test with our estimates. 
 
Product market regulation  
In recent years, various reforms have been introduced to reduce rents in the goods 
markets in European economies and thus a natural experiment is to verify their prevailing 
effects in terms of changes in LS.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 In a second model, the efficient bargaining, both wages and employments are bargained over and the 
contract curve, which slopes upwards in wage-employment space, is obtained by tangency points between 
union’s indifference curves and isoprofit contours (Mc Donald and Solow, 1981). 
11 For instance, the wage bill utility function is obtained for r=z=0 and δ and λ =1/2, while the rent utility 
function (i.e. the case where union wants to maximise the excess of the wage bill paid to its members) is 
obtained for z=0 and δ=λ=1/2. Finally, λ=0, gives the seniority model, i.e. the case where unions only 
care about utility of their members. 
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As known, the original argument provided by Kalecki (1971) was that greater 
competition should have caused erosion of monopolistic positions and the squeeze of 
profits, with a consequent increase in the labour share. Interacting effects of non 
competitive product and labour markets were later formalised in Neo Keynesian models 
that showed that the presence of unions reverses the traditional Kaleckian relation in that 
unions manage to appropriate part of the firm’s rents. Hence, product market power that 
creates rents also opens the space for their distribution between capital and workers and, 
thus, may have a positive impact on wages (Nickell et al. 1994). 
In recent years, multiple channels through which competitive conditions can 
influence labour market outcomes have received attention by the vast empirical research 
conducted by the OECD studies. Pro-competitive product policies, that raise the elasticity 
of product demand, exert moderating influences in wage requests and, through the channel 
of labour demand, an expansion of employment, as empirically tested by Bassanini and 
Duval (2006). Furthermore, competitive measures represented by lower barriers to entry, 
exert positive effects on LS. Indeed, pro market deregulation that encourages entrance of 
new firms causes an aggregate output expansion and a rise in wages and labour demand, 
with unambiguous (positive) effects on labour income share (as formalised by Blanchard 
and Giavazzi, 2003). 
Notice, however, that empirical studies use the OECD aggregate indicator for product 
market regulation (PMR) that covers various areas; these areas range from public control 
and price control, to barriers to trade and legal and administrative barriers to entry 
(Conway, Janod and Nicoletti, 2005). The expected effects of these different provisions 
may diverge. For provisions that measure the intensity of competitive pressures, positive 
effects on LS are likely. However, for some others, such as privatization programmes, 
measured by the OECD indicator as a shift toward pro-competitive policies, the likely effect 
is job shedding, and through this channel, a contraction of labour share, as found for the 
network industries by Azmant, Manning and Van Reenen (2012). Thus, the expected final 
effect of PMR on labour shares remains ambiguous.  
 
4. Evidence   
4.1 Data 
Our empirical investigation relies on several databases: EU KLEMS accounts for the 
labour share, and the capital-output ratio, the OECD indexes for employment protection and 
product market regulation, Visser database for measures of collective relations, i.e. union 
density and bargaining coverage, and EUROSTAT for employment series (see Appendix, 
Table A1). 
Our dependent variable is the labour share that measures the fraction of national 
income accruing to labour. Unfortunately, information concerning wages and salaries is not 
available in the EU KLEMS database, thus this variable is proxied by the ratio of total 
compensation of employees (wages and salaries before taxes, as well as employers’ social 
contributions) over gross domestic product.  
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This measure underestimates labour share because it excludes incomes generated 
from self-employment, which are considered mixed income (from property and labour), and 
whose attribution to either labour or capital is questionable. A number of solutions have 
been proposed, such as that of including all self employment incomes - or a fraction of 
these- in labour share; in this case a second question is that of a proper measure of wages of 
self employees, solved by ad hoc assumptions of attributing them the same wage of 
dependent workers. We prefer performing our estimates by using unadjusted labour shares 
(i.e. without self-employment), also to prevent confounding effects, since employment 
protection legislation only covers employees. In addition, with this choice we avoid 
assumptions that are controversial, and that usually provide questionable values, as pointed 
out by Daudey and García-Peñalosa (2007). In any case, we offer below a comparison of 
descriptive statistics for adjusted and non adjusted labour shares to evaluate the different 
importance of self-employment in different countries. As we shall see, in some countries 
self-employment is not negligible; for this reason we shall also consider this category of 
labour as control variable in our econometric analysis. 
The first step of our research involves matching the several database we use and 
carrying out disaggregated analyses at sector and country levels. First, the availability of 
data and the needs for a large and consistent sector-country profile led us to select only 14 
countries out of the 27 European Union members and to re-arrange the NACE rev.1 
sections into 9 industries.  
This made it possible to compare the following economies: Austria, Belgium, the 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. This selection, as noted above, was dictated 
by data availability and includes two sets of countries: i) 12 Old Member States; ii) 2 New 
Member States. The second small set comprises Hungary and the Czech Republic, two 
“market-oriented” economies with some similarities to the Anglo-Saxon countries 
(European Commission, 2004). 
The selected sectors consist of: 1) Agriculture; 2) Mining and Quarrying, 3) 
Manufacturing; 4) Energy sectors), 5) Construction, 6) Wholesale and Retail Trade, 7) 
Hotels and Restaurants, 8) Transport, Storage and Communications, 9) Financial 
Intermediation, Real Estate and Business Services. 
The EUROSTAT database was used to gather the share of workers with temporary 
contracts to total employees at sector-country level. Indeed, as seen below, we used a 
difference-in-difference model, and introduced the sectoral average level of the share of 
temporary workers in the UK as a benchmark, i.e. as the underlying propensity to use 
temporary workers in the absence of EPLT.  
Lastly, UK industry-level layoff rates, defined as the percentage ratio of annual lay-
offs to total employment, were introduced as a proxy for lay-off propensity in the absence 
of EPLR, and were obtained from the waves of the UK Quarterly Labour Force Survey, 
released by the Office of National Statistics. 
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4.2 Descriptive evidence 
Before testing the role of the different driving forces behind the country-sector labour 
income shares, we have a closer inspection of data. To summarise, from descriptive 
statistics emerge some relevant points:  
• in most countries factor shares present a sluggish or declining trend, with total 
average values in the two sub-periods, 1995-2001 and 2001-2007, close to 49% and 48%, 
respectively;  
• an increasing degree of variation between the different economies is recorded over 
time, but the labour share remains more heterogeneous across sectors, rather than across 
countries; 
• the change of the weights of various sectors has had only limited influence in 
explaining labour share movements, whereas changes of labour share within sectors play a 
dominant role. 
More details are offered below. Table 1 reports information by countries and shows, 
for the period 1995- 2007, an average value of LS of about 49%, but also large differences 
across European economies. The lowest figures are recorded in Italy (38%), the highest in 
Denmark, Sweden (approximately 55%) and UK (56%). Italy, after Ireland, also records the 
lowest minimum value, whereas we find again Denmark (57%) Sweden and UK (58%)  as 
the countries at the top for maximum values. A plausible explanation of the UK position 
relies on the sectoral specialisation of this country, mainly oriented to high labour intensive 
sectors, such as services. As we shall see below, our econometric analysis addressing causal 
link between EPLT and labour share by country-sector estimates allows us to take into 
account these sectoral composition effects. From our data an increase in country 
differentials	  also emerges, since the standard deviation passes from 4.99 in 2001 to 5.81 in 
2007 (see Table 2, Panel A) 
INSERT TABLE 1 
INSERT TABLE 2 
 
Country differentials may be related to differences in the structural composition of 
employment, as shown by the comparison between non adjusted and adjusted labour shares 
(that include self employment) (Figure 1). Indeed, Italy is characterised by the highest 
incidence of self employment, a fact that contributes to explain its lowest position in terms 
of non adjusted labour share. Thus, the inclusion of self employment makes a significant 
difference, and Italy is no more in the lowest position but, in any case, it remains in the 
bottom range. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 
Additional information regarding time variations are obtained by splitting the 
sampled period in two intervals: 1995-2001 and 2002-2007. A visualisation is given in 
Figure 2, which shows the declining or stable tendencies recorded for 10 EU economies 
(out of fourteen) in the sub-period 2002-2007. Also, notice also that two of the four 
countries that in this sub-period have recorded a slight increase (Italy and Ireland) are, in 
13	  
	  
any case, those in the lowest position and that registered a remarkable negative trend in the 
first sub-period (1995-2001). Conversely, Germany, Belgium and Netherlands, whose 
values of LS are above the average levels in each sub-period, record the highest reductions 
in the second sub-period (-4.3, -2.7 and -2.6 percentage points, respectively).  
INSERT FIGURE 2 
Other meaningful heterogeneities are displayed by sectoral data: Table 3 reveals 
ample divergences, higher than those observed by countries. The lowest figures of LS are in 
Agriculture (27%) and the highest in Construction and Hotels& Restaurants (about 60%), 
followed by Manufacturing (59%). Interestingly, for services, the Financial and Real Estate 
sector reaches one of the lowest figures (only 37%), and after Transport and 
Communications, also the lowest coefficient of variation. Further, Table 2 (Panel B) also 
shows the high and increasing standard deviations of LS across sectors.  
A comparison of adjusted and non adjusted LS by sectors confirms the highest 
position of Construction and Hotels&Restaurants, but also shows that when self 
employment is taken into account, Trade and Agriculture get a higher position, higher than 
that recorded in Manufacturing.  
INSERT FIGURE 3 
The ample differentials by sectors led us to verify if the steady or declining changes 
recorded in almost all countries since the mid-1990s could also reflect the growing 
importance of sectors with stable or declining LS, whose weight on aggregate income is  
boosted with respect to those characterised by increasing LS.  
Indeed, as seen in Arpaia et al. (2009), three different effects may operate. The first is 
the change in the weights of each sector; the second is the change in labour shares within 
sectors, the third is the changing structure of total employment represented by variations in 
the share of self employees. We thus have the following expression:  
(1) 
 
 
where ∆ALS is the change in aggregate adjusted labour share, CE are compensation of 
employees, va is the national value added, TE and E, total employment and employment, 
respectively, ω the weight of each i sector on national value added, q the ratio E/TE, i=1, 
...9 sectors, t=1995,...2007. 
The first term of (1) can thus measure the quantitative importance of the 
compositional bias, i.e. the role played by changes in the sectoral composition recorded in 
the 14 European economies of our sample, whereas the second and third terms describe, 
respectively, the employees’ remuneration effect and the employment structure effect (i.e. 
the contribution of self-employed) mentioned above. A comparison of these effects is 
shown in Figure 4. 
INSERT FIGURE 4 
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Figure 4 makes it clear that the sluggish or declining movement of the aggregate 
labour share recorded in most countries is mainly due to moderation of labour 
compensations within countries (the remuneration effect), whereas it only partially reflects a 
shift from high labour intensive industries to the low labour intensive sector. Sectoral 
composition effect is, in any case, not negligible and almost always contributes negatively 
to labour share changes. On the contrary, employment structure effect contributes positively 
and for most countries partially offsets the negative contribution of the other two factors. 
This analysis thus shows that compositional biases are insufficient to explain the observed 
trend of labour shares and motivates us to explore the role of institutional reforms.  
Indeed, there have been changes in labour and product market policies and as 
assessed by the IMF (2007, p.170), “Reforms have proceeded in several areas, but generally 
in the direction of lowering the cost of labour to business and enhancing the ﬂexibility of 
markets”. One of the main developments in labour market policies is particularly worth 
noting; it is the substantial decline in legislated employment protection. Job protection is 
usually measured by using two time-varying cross-country data: the OECD Employment 
Protection Legislation index for regular contracts (EPLR) and, for temporary contracts 
(EPLT)12. The changes recorded for our sampled countries, as shown in Figure 5, confirm 
that the greatest relaxation in strictness of rules is recorded for temporary contracts. 
Reforms for these types of contracts have characterised various countries and have been 
more important than changes in rules for regular contracts. Indeed, a broad picture of cross-
country differences in EPLR shows that low and high EPLR countries have kept statutory 
protection of regular jobs almost unchanged (see also Venn, 2009). 
INSERT FIGURE 5 
The role of employment protection restrictive stances across Europe is a matter of 
further explorations with our estimates. 
 
4.3 Estimates 
Estimation strategy 
In this section we estimate our key equation for labour share (LS), and two 
supplementary equations concerning employment and average compensation (that is the 
ratio of total labour compensation on employees). Such a strategy allows us to verify how 
each explanatory variable influences the labour share and its components.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 The EPLR OECD index refers to eight items which weigh three major groups of restrictions: i) 
procedural inconvenience (such as notification procedures), ii) severance pay, and iii) difficulty of 
individual dismissals (definition of unfair dismissal and related items). The EPLT index includes norms 
for fixed-term contracts and temporary work agency employment. For both types of contract, the OECD 
sub-indexes include information on the valid cases for which these types of contracts are legal, 
restrictions on the number of renewals, and their maximum cumulated duration (OECD, 2004). A revised 
OECD indicator covers a third area, i.e., restrictions on collective dismissals (EPLC). EPLC has only 
been available since 1998 and this does not allow comparisons over our observation period (1995-2007).  
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We estimate the impact of the degree of stringency of EPLT on cross-industry 
differences,	   by following the literature based on the difference-in-difference method 
inaugurated by Rajan and Zingales (1998) in the finance literature and applied to labour 
analyses by Bassanini, Nunziata and Venn (2009). The estimates, for our sample of 9 
industries in 14 EU economies, exploit both variations in the regulation across countries and 
the different influence of regulation in different sectors. We estimate the role of EPLT 
considering whether its impact is greater on industries in which, in the absence of 
regulations, the propensity to employ temporary workers would be higher. The ‘natural’ 
degree of adoption of temporary contracts at the industry level is thus measured computing 
the adoption of these contracts in a country with no employment regulation. In this country 
we assume that the ranking of variability across industries is a good proxy of the ‘intrinsic’ 
sectoral differentials in terms of temporary contracts. The interaction between a country 
level variable (EPLT) and a sector level variable for temporary contract rates for this 
country, allow us to identify the causal effect of employment protection on labour share.  
Analogously, we control for the role of EPLR assuming that the effect of 
liberalisations of regular jobs is more important in industries where the layoff propensity is 
higher. 
The UK temporary contract rates (TWS _Benchi) or lay-off rates (LO.Benchi) for each 
industry i are used to proxy for the natural propensity of industries to make high recourse to 
numerical flexibility in labour arrangements. Indeed, we assume that in the UK the lowest 
stringency in labour protection (both for temporary and regular workers) make differences 
in employment decisions among sectors only motivated by technological and other sector-
specific factors, irrespective of influences caused by protection legislation. Each equation 
thus includes the interaction terms TWS_Benchi*EPLT(j,t-1)  and LO_Benchi*EPLR(j,t-1), 
where Benchi is the UK value. 
In some specifications we also include other institutional controls available only at 
country level such as Union density (UD) and bargaining coverage (COV). Following the 
same strategy, we have estimated their role by including the interaction terms LO_Benchi 
*UD(j,t-1) and LO_Benchi*COV(j,t-1), the hypothesis being that the protective role of 
worker representatives and of coverage of collective negotiations is higher in those sectors 
that are more exposed to threats of dismissals, i.e. with higher layoff rates. Each 
specification includes the main effect, that is the control for the labour institutional variable 
at country level, and the interaction terms discussed above. The last institutional control 
variable we insert is Product Market Regulation (PMR), available at the sector-country 
level, and thus does not need an interaction term. 
In addition, our linear regression model includes another key control variable, 
discussed in section 3: the capital/output ratio (K/Y). As robustness check, we also take into 
account, in additional estimates, the ratio of employees/total employment (q), that allows  
us to control for the country-sectoral differentials in employment structure (employees and 
self-employed).  
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Finally, we include country by year dummies, Dit, to control for country specific 
changes (including business cycles) that may condition movements of LS and sector 
dummies Dj to control for highly sector-specific factors which probably influenced our 
dependent variables and which cannot be captured by means of the labour policy variables 
included in our analysis. For instance, a larger array of labour institutions should be 
included as determinants of LS, but are omitted due to the lack of availability of time-
varying data, among others unemployment protection (measured by replacement ratios and 
duration of unemployment benefits) as well as active labour market policies. Other country-
sector specific factors, such as the role of technological progress and openness to trade, 
discussed in Section 2, are captured by the set of dummy variables included in our 
specifications.  
The same specifications adopted for LS are replicated for its components, i.e. Comp 
and Empl.  
 𝐿𝑆!,!,! = 𝛽!  𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑇!,!!! +   𝛽!TWS_Bench! ∗ 𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑇!,!!! + 𝛽!𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑅!,!!! +   𝛽!LO_Bench! ∗𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑅!,!!!+𝛽!LO_Bench! ∗ 𝑈𝐷!,!!! +   𝛽!LO_Bench! ∗ 𝐶𝑂𝑉!,!!! +   𝛽!𝑃𝑀𝑅!,!,!!! + 𝛽!𝐾𝑂!,!,! + 𝑞!,!,! +𝐷!,! + 𝐷! + 𝜀!,!,! 
 𝐿𝑛(𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙)!,!,! = 𝛽!  𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑇!,!!! +   𝛽!TWS_Bench! ∗ 𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑇!,!!! + 𝛽!𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑅!,!!! +   𝛽!LO_Bench! ∗𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑅!,!!!+𝛽!LO_Bench! ∗ 𝑈𝐷!,!!! +   𝛽!LO_Bench! ∗ 𝐶𝑂𝑉!,!!! +   𝛽!𝑃𝑀𝑅!,!,!!! + 𝛽!𝐾𝑂!,!,! +𝑞!,!,! + 𝐷!,! + 𝐷! + 𝜀!,!,! 
 𝐿𝑛(𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒)!,!,! = 𝛽!  𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑇!,!!! +   𝛽!TWS_Bench! ∗ 𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑇!,!!! + 𝛽!𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑅!,!!! +   𝛽!LO_Bench! ∗𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑅!,!!!+𝛽!LO_Bench! ∗ 𝑈𝐷!,!!! +   𝛽!LO_Bench! ∗ 𝐶𝑂𝑉!,!!! +   𝛽!𝑃𝑀𝑅!,!,!!! + 𝛽!𝐾𝑂!,!,! +𝑞!,!,! + 𝐷!,! + 𝐷! + 𝜀!,!,! 
 
where Lsi,j, Empli,j, Comp,j  are the labour share, employment, average compensation in  
i=1,…9 sectors, j=1,...14 countries, t= 1995, …2007 years.  
According to Azmat, Manning and Van Reenen (2012) in order to address the 
normality assumption requested in the OLS regression, we take our dependent variables Empl 
and Comp in log, and apply the Newey-West technique to correct for heteroschedasticity and 
first-order serial correlation. 
 
4.4. Results 
Main results  
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Table 4 lists the estimates for LS. The first column reports the results of a baseline 
specification in which only the capital-output ratio and EPLT (i.e. our key institutional 
determinant of labour share at country level, without the interaction term) are included. As 
one can see, protection for temporary workers exerts a positive influence on labour share.  
In a second specification, (column 2), we rule out potential confounding factors and insert 
EPLT, interacted with the share of  temporary contracts at the sector level in the UK, i.e. the 
interaction term  TWS_Benchi*EPLT. As mentioned above, we have treated estimated 
coefficients of EPLT, interacted with indicators of temporary contracts, as evidence of a 
causal impact of regulations on cross-industry LS differences. Thus, the variable of main 
interest in our analysis is TWS_Benchi*EPLT(j,t-1).  The results we obtain confirm that the 
stringency of protection level for temporary workers positively affects the labour share.  
More precisely, in this case the diff in diff estimates suggest that LS tends to be lower 
in industries with greater propensity to use temporary contracts, the less stringent the level 
of EPLT. This main finding is confirmed in all specifications (columns 3-8), that allow 
controlling for other variables, i.e. EPLR, union density UD, coverage bargaining (COV), 
and their interaction (UD*COV), product market regulation (PMR) and the employment 
structure (q). 
In order to better evaluate the meaning of our key result (i.e. the coefficient of  
TWS_Benchi*EPLT), let us consider, for example, two sectors, Construction and 
Manufacturing with different natural propensities to employ temporary workers, since in the 
UK (the benchmark case) the share of temporary workers in Construction is 5.18%, whereas 
it is only 3.90% in Manufacturing. We can now quantify, on the basis of our estimates for 
the period 1995-2007, the difference of LS changes between these two sectors recorded in 
different countries, and explained by their respective EPLT stances. We compare Italy, the 
case with the greatest reduction in EPLT (-3.5), with Belgium and the Netherlands, two 
countries that have recorded slighter reductions in EPLT (-2 and -1.19, respectively). We 
get the results shown in Table 5.  
In Table 5, columns 1, 2 and 3 report, respectively, the values of LS changes in 
Construction and Manufacturing, and their difference in each economy. Column 4 shows 
the estimated coefficient β for EPLT in baseline specifications (columns 2 and 3 of Table 
4), columns 5 of Table 5 reports the different natural propensities to use temporary 
contracts, ∆Λ (obtained from the values of the UK) and column 6 the reduction of EPLT of 
the three economies, ∆EPLT. Finally, column 7 and 8 show the values (absolute and in 
percentage, respectively) of the reduction of LS explained by a lower level of labour 
protection. The result we obtain, taking our estimates at face value, is that for Italy more 
than 90% of the difference of LS changes between Construction and Manufacturing is 
explained by weakening of EPLT. This means that the Italian functional distribution of 
income appears to be significantly influenced by its far reaching liberalisations of the labour 
market that contributed to instability of working conditions and other significant figures can 
easily be obtained for other country-sectoral comparisons.  
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In previous section we have assumed that higher degree of EPLT has a positive effect 
on wages and null or negative influence on employment13. These results are confirmed in 
our equations for compensation (Comp) (Table 6) and employment (Empl) (Table 7), while 
the overall impact on labour shares (LS) is positive (Table 4).  
These results suggest that reforms to liberalise the use of temporary workers and 
reduce EPLT may be perverse: when firms are allowed to hire workers on fixed-term 
contracts they pay lower wages, offer less training and give few opportunities for career 
advancement.  
Indeed, the use of fixed term contracts and the consequent segmentation of internal 
labour market within firms enhances the opportunity costs of labour and may raise 
coordination failures. On the opposite, in line with the ‘high performance" 
paradigm’(Delaney and Godard, 2000),  innovative’ management strategies lead companies 
to providing employees with provision of job security, low turnover rates and 
“empowerment” HR practices, that include participation, team cooperation, internal labour 
markets and opportunities inside the firm.  
Other results 
It is important to also discuss the main results concerning control variables. In 
particular, the coefficients we obtained for union density, coverage bargaining, protection 
levels for regular workers (EPLR) are worth noting.  
For unionisation one can expect that this variable, as a proxy of worker bargaining 
power, may have counterbalanced the negative effects of liberalisation of labour market for 
temporary workers. Notice, however, that labour share dynamic is conditioned by the 
intensities of wage push and employment changes that also reflect the respective 
weights of these variables in union preferences.  
We have estimated the role of UD on LS interacted with layoff propensity in order to 
test the more significant impact of unions on those sectors where their representatives are 
more exposed to risk of being fired. Our results show that unionisation has played a 
negative role on LS, as seen from the values of coefficients associated with 
LO_Bench*UD(j,t-1) in LS estimates (columns 4, 6,7, 8 of Table 4). This result is also 
obtained when we control for coverage of collective bargaining. From additional estimates 
for LS components, it emerges that unionisation, which is a proxy for worker bargaining 
power, has exerted a positive role only on employment levels (Table 7, columns 4, 7, 8) and 
a negative impact on compensations (Table 6, columns 4,6,7,8). This seems to suggest that 
worker representatives have attached greater weight to employment stability and accepted 
compensative policies based on wage moderation. Paradoxically, it configures a sort of 
‘reversal’ of the standard right to manage model, i.e. a situation where unions have 
bargained over employment and reduced wage claims, accepting pay conditions imposed by 
labour demand.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  Indeed, in previous section we simmetrically said that liberalisation of labour market for temporary 
contracts depresses wages but benefits employment. 
19	  
	  
It is interesting to note that these results are coherent with estimated coefficients of 
EPLR, interacted with the indicator of layoff propensity, significant and negative in LS and 
compensation estimates (Table 4 and 6) and positive in employment specifications (Table 
7): compensations tend to be lower in industries (with a greater propensity to layoffs), when 
the level of EPLR is more stringent, whereas opposite effects emerge for employment. This 
implies, as predicted from the implicit contract theory, that jobholders have signed a tacit 
agreement based on acceptance of lower pays as an ‘insurance premium’ for job security, 
thus protecting themselves from employment fluctuations. This suggests a change in the 
union preferences from wage claims to employment stability.  
We also control for PMR and obtain that high degrees of product market regulation 
have positive effects on LS. Notice, as stated above, that the OECD indicator for product 
market regulation (PMR) also covers privatization programmes, measured as a shift toward 
pro-competitive policies, whose likely effects are restructuring processes and staff 
reduction, as found for the network industries by Azmat, Manning and Van Reenen (2011). 
From our estimates, in any case, no significant influence on compensation and employment 
components have been obtained. The weak evidence for compensation and employment 
effects may thus be the result of different deregulation programmes, which include both 
privatisation process as well as increases of the degree of product market competition in 
private sectors, with likely differential effects on labour market outcomes. Further research 
in this area may shed light on the various impacts of these different policy reforms for the 
whole set of industries analysed in our sample. 
Finally, it is worth noting that our key non-institutional control variable (i.e. capital-
output ratio) is related to the different technologies, which vary across industries, and that 
we capture with capital intensity. The negative coefficients associated to K/Y obtained in 
our estimates for LS indicate a significant substitutability between labour and capital, 
meaning that an increase in the capital-output ratio is associated with a smaller labour 
share.14. The negative effects for compensations are consistent with the hypothesis of 
Hicks’s labour saving technical progress, i.e. with an increase of the ratio of the marginal 
product of capital to that of labour (Hicks, 1932, p. 121). These negative effects could also 
be justified by a scarcity of high-skilled workers, caused by the diffusion of temporary 
workers, that negatively influences rewards also in capital intensive industries (see 
Acemoglu, 2009 for a paper that studies the conditions under which scarcity of labour 
stimulates changes in technology adoption).  
An alternative consideration is that K/Y is likely to be endogenous to LS and we 
cannot interpret the estimated coefficients of the capital  output ratio in terms of  evidence 
of a causal impact, an issue addressed below. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Obviously this is a very general result that needs additional exploration in future research. In our case 
detecting if substitutability between capital and labour also holds in contexts in which we distinguish 
between different typologies of capital (i.e. ICT and no-ICT capital) and labour (high skilled vs. low 
skilled workers) is out of the scope of the paper. 
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Endogeneity 
Capital output ratio as well as EPLT reforms may be conditioned by changes in factor 
distribution and thus these potential feedbacks (from our dependent variables and these 
regressors) may induce a cautionary interpretation of previous results15. A robustness check 
is carried out by instrumental variables estimates. This method requires finding instruments 
that can predict the level of EPLT and of K/Y, without affecting directly the dependent 
variable. Since the choice is not simple, we have decided to use lagged values as 
instruments and have obtained the results shown in Table 8. 
From the endogeneity tests, the hypothesis of endogeneity of K/Y on wage equations 
cannot be rejected (see also Table A.2) whereas we can reject endogeneity of EPLT (with 
the interaction term) for LS and its component. What is relevant, in any case, is that IV 
estimates confirm our main findings. 
 
5. Conclusions 
The impact of labour market reforms that have lowered protection of temporary 
contracts has been documented in a number of works, but their effects of income 
distribution is still an open question. We have analysed this issue by considering country-
sector evidence for 14 EU economies and a sample period, 1995-2007, up to now not 
covered by related literature.  
Our focus on changes in the stringency of employment protection of temporary jobs 
has allowed us to show that these reforms, that have contributed to instability of working 
conditions, have negatively influenced the labour share, thus failing to contrast the declined 
trends in the labour share recorded in previous decades.  
Indeed, we estimated labour share, as well as its components, compensation and  
employment, and consider a whole set of control variables. We obtained that legislative 
innovations that have favoured the extensive use of temporary contracts have likely 
favoured the access of additional workers (likely young and women) to the labour market, 
but have at the same time penalised the rewards of all employees, insiders as well as entrant 
marginal workers. Thus the overall balance of employment and compensation effects has 
been negative, as our estimates for the income share accruing to workers seem to suggest.  
These findings have been validated by various robustness checks. We have controlled 
for employment protection of regular workers, characteristics of wage setting, product 
market regulation and capital-output ratio. What we have found, taking into account this 
whole set of variables, is that in a scenario of precarious working conditions, employees and 
their representatives have exerted their bargaining power to moderate their wage demands, 
thus paying an implicit insurance premium against the risk of employment fluctuations.  
Our final considerations concern policy implications. Sluggishness of labour share 
calls for political interventions not covered in the 1994 Jobs Strategy. Real wages, growth 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Actually, the difference-in-differences strategy is also set up to solve this problem (Bassanini, Nunziata 
and Venn, 2009). Nevertheless, in order to guarantee more robustness to our result we decided to perform 
endogeneity tests by means of the instrumental variable method. 
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job quality, and living standards must be components of an integrated strategy along the 
lines suggested (but not sufficiently implemented) by a Restated Job Strategy, which in 
2006 advocated as crucial issues “Improving labour force skills and competences through 
wide-ranging changes in education and training systems.”(OECD, 2006, p. 24) However, as 
documented for European countries by the EU Commission, in the last few years several 
countries have gone in opposite direction, loosening employment protection legislation for 
permanent contracts “in view to align it with protection of temporary contracts, and further 
deregulating temporary contracts” (EU Commission, 2011, p. 37)16. Our key message is that 
this kind of reforms may lead only to transitory employment gains, whereas they exert 
persistent offsetting effects on income distribution of temporary workers, who see  
deteriorate their pays and career prospects. Opposite policies, more favourable to labour 
shares, could sustain demand and give actual  boost to faster  growth.  
 
Appendix 
A1 LS moves counter-cyclically under EPL 
We show that even in standard neoclassical model, based on a unitary elasticity of 
substitution between capital and labour, the presence of uncertainty in a friction economy, 
thus characterised by EPLT, implies that LS is no more constant but moves counter-
cyclically (Kessing, 2003). Indeed, firing-hiring costs influence not only current profits, but 
also the whole stream of expected future profits (Bentolila and Bertola, 1990) and cause a 
discrepancy between the marginal revenue product of labour and the real wage (Bentolila 
and Saint Paul (2003). In cases of adverse economic conditions (bad states, b), firms hoard 
some workers, paying them a wage rate w equal to the marginal product of labour (MRPLb) 
plus the firing cost f (the adjustment cost they avoid if give up from firing), i.e. wb=MRgb+ 
φb. Conversely, in good states g, the wage rate equates the marginal revenue product of 
labour less the expected discounted value of firing costs, since the firm takes into account 
the likely  necessity of firing in next periods (higher uncertainty might be expected to 
increase the likelihood that a worker be fired) and thus cuts the current wage, so that wg= 
MRPLg – φg.). Thus labour share is higher in downturns and lower in upturns.  
Indeed, one gets: wb=MRgb+ φb and wg= MRPLg – φg. For a Cobb Douglas technology (Y= 
KαL(1-α)) and a markup µ, one easily gets:  
LS= µ [(1- α ) w]/ (w- φb) 
LS= µ [(1- α ) w]/ (w+ φg) 
which give that labour share is higher in downturns and reduced in upturns. Indeed, the first 
order condition for profit maximisation gives (wb- φb) = µ(1- α )Y/L and hence one obtains  
L=  µ (1- α ) Y/(wb- φb), so that LS= µ [(1- α ) w]/ (w- φb). Analogously, one can obtain LS 
for good states LS= µ [(1- α ) w]/ (w+ φg). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 The EU Commission, in the Annual Growth Survey 2012, does not mention explicit recommendations 
to Member States for temporary contracts legislation and considers that Member States should give 
priority to: “Reforming employment protection legislation in consultation with social partners, reducing 
the excessive rigidities of permanent contracts and providing protection and easier access to the labour 
market to those left outside, in particular young people.” (p.11) 
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A.2 The Right to manage model and the role of union preferences 
Assuming an asymmetric Nash bargaining scheme, the wage solution is a function of 
the parties bargaining power, of their respective objective functions and of their threat 
points, the fall-back positions in case of disagreement. The generalised Nash bargaining 
solution emerges from the following maximisation programme:  
 max )1()),((())(),(( 1 ALwrVLwV ccwc
ββ ππ −−−=Ω  
where V and π are, respectively, the union utility and the firm’s profit,  wc is the 
company remuneration, L is the company employment level. r (the reservation wage) and 
π 	  (the minimum level of profits) are the solutions in case of disagreements. 
The first order condition for maximisation of Ω gives the following:  
β β
π
π π
V
V V
'
( )
'
−
= −
−
1  
 where V’ and π ’ are the first derivatives of V and π  with respect to wc and expresses 
gains of each party (weighted by their respective powers), which condition distribution of 
national income. The explicit solution of (A1), that determines labour share, requires that 
union preferences and constraints are considered. A convenient characterisation of the 
union utility function V, as reviewed in Oswald (1985) is the Stone-Geary functional form: 
V= (w-r)δ (L-z)λ 
where r and z are minimum or references values of wages (w) and employment (L), 
while δ and λ gives their relative importance to the union.  
The closer is λ to 0, the lower is the mark-up of the wage rate to the reservation value 
r. Indeed, if we assume δ =1- λ , so that V= (w-r)(1- λ) (L-z)λ , a  Cobb Douglas production 
function y= Lα, and a constant elasticity of product demand θ, it is possible to obtain the 
wage equation: 
rw cw )1()'1(')1(
)')1(
λβααββλ
αββλ
−−−−+
−+
=  
where α ’= θθα /)1( − , which gives w=r for λ=1, i.e. the wage mark-up over the 
reservation wage is null if union cares only about employment. (Manning, 1990) 
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Table 1: Labour share in 14 European economies, 1995-2007 
Country Mean 
Coeff. 
Var. Min Max 
Variation 
2001-1995 
(percentage 
points) 
Variation 
2007-2002 
(percentage 
points) 
AUT 0.494 0.044 0.464 0.532 -0.042 -0.023 
BEL 0.494 0.021 0.478 0.510 0.015 -0.027 
CZE 0.435 0.016 0.427 0.450 -0.008 0.000 
DNK 0.545 0.023 0.525 0.571 0.020 0.020 
ESP 0.471 0.021 0.456 0.485 0.021 -0.020 
FIN 0.472 0.017 0.461 0.487 -0.017 -0.001 
FRA 0.522 0.006 0.516 0.526 -0.002 -0.008 
GER 0.534 0.035 0.498 0.556 -0.008 -0.043 
HUN 0.469 0.032 0.435 0.486 0.012 0.005 
IRL 0.382 0.053 0.352 0.419 -0.047 0.024 
ITA 0.380 0.020 0.370 0.390 -0.018 0.016 
NLD 0.515 0.020 0.498 0.528 0.011 -0.026 
SWE 0.547 0.036 0.509 0.581 0.072 -0.021 
UK 0.560 0.028 0.532 0.586 0.039 -0.019 
 
Table 2: Mean and standard deviations of labour shares in 14 European economies 
 1995 2001  2007 1995  2001 2007 
Mean 48.93 49.27 48.16 48.93 49.27 48.16 
 Panel A Panel B 
 All countries All sectors 
 1995 2001 2007 1995 2001 2007 
Standard Dev. 4.99 6.75 5.81 14.68 13.34 15.88 
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Table 3: Labour share by sectors, average values in 14 European economies, 1995-
2007 
 
Mean 
Coeff. 
Var. Min Max 
Agriculture 0.273 0.380 0.126 0.464 
Constructions 0.606 0.187 0.418 0.816 
Electricity &Gas 0.331 0.290 0.201 0.489 
Finance & Real Estate 0.370 0.174 0.249 0.484 
Hotels &Restaurants 0.604 0.191 0.439 0.806 
Manufacturing 0.591 0.183 0.290 0.717 
Mining 0.429 0.539 0.055 0.820 
Transports &Communications 0.534 0.173 0.361 0.680 
Wholesale &Retail Trade 0.565 0.187 0.315 0.709 
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Table 4: Employment protection of temporary contracts and labour shares: Diff in diff  
estimates 
Dependent variable: Labour Share 
Explanatory variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
EPLT *  TWS_Bench 
 
0.452** 0.455** 0.462** 0.462** 0.474** 0.521** 0.640*** 
  
(0.216) (0.216) (0.216) (0.216) (0.218) (0.210) (0.201) 
EPLT 19.576*** 15.667*** 2.292 -3.966 377.118 22.842 0.8.22 -13.959 
 (1.656) (2.613) (7.389) (7.933) (334.135) (377.608) (7.608) (9.393) 
Capital/output ratio -1.076*** -0.907** -0.881** -0.827** -0.868** -0.849** -1.267*** -0.579 
 (0.378) (0.388) (0.390) (0.397) (0.389) (0.407) (0.392) (0.356) 
EPLR *  Lay Off_Bench   -0.935** -1.115*** -0.977** -1.584*** -1.500*** -1.731*** 
   (0.422) (0.426) (0.429) (0.467) (0.444) (0.431) 
EPLR   10.954*** 3.648 7.304 5.217 4.076 9.442 
   (4.131) (5.289) (5.094) (5.576) (5.160) (6.262) 
UD * Lay Off_Bench 
 
  -0.022*  -0.027* -0.024** -0.025** 
  
  (0.011)  (0.153) (0.011) (0.010) 
UD    0.966**  0.937** 0.777** 0.279 
    (0.379)  (0.423) (0.347) (0.386) 
COV* Lay Off_Bench 
    
-5.658 -0.230   
     
(4.992) (5.623)   
COV 
    
0.017 -0.046   
 
    
(0.018) (0.055)   
COV*UD*Lay Off_Bench 
     
(0.000)   
 
     
(0.002)   
PMR       0.359*** 0.324*** 
       (0.062) (0.055) 
Employees/Tot.empl.        57.532*** 
        (3.651) 
Country*Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Sector dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Obs 1284 1284 1284 1284 1284 1284 1284 1284 
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Table 5: Differences of LS between Construction and Manufacturing explained by EPLT changes 
over the period 1995-2007 in three economies 
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Table 6: Employment protection of temporary contracts and compensations- diff in diff estimates 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
 
Dependent variable: Ln(Compensation) 
Explanatory variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
EPLT *  TWS_Bench 
 
0.648** 0.665** 0.683** 0.637** 0.641** 0.657** 0.687** 
  
(0.324) (0.315) (0.314) (0.314) (0.315) (0.312) (0.314) 
EPLT 681.07*** 675.47*** 692.05*** 703.65*** -177.17 536.36 701.58*** 697.84*** 
 (3.756) (4.580) (14.893) (15.569) (756.759) (824.882) (15.512) (15.815) 
Capital/output ratio -6.057*** -5.815*** -5.620*** -5.510*** -5.679*** -5.850*** -5.320*** -5.146*** 
 (0.759) (0.752) (0.754) (0.759) (0.753) (0.763) (0.794) (0.799) 
EPLR *  Lay 
Off_Bench   -4.325*** -4.746*** -4.158*** -5.624*** -4.580*** -4.638*** 
   (0.837) (0.810) (0.764) (0.821) (0.802) (0.819) 
EPLR   7.533 24.921** 15.738 28.801** 24.735** 26.091** 
   (8.557) (11.385) (11.187) (12.215) (11.312) (11.566) 
UD * Lay Off_Bench 
 
  -1.538**  -1.664** -1.456* -1.582** 
  
  (0.778)  (0.837) (0.783) (0.795) 
UD    -0.051**  -0.910*** -0.050** -0.050** 
    (0.021)  (0.303) (0.020) (0.020) 
COV* Lay Off_Bench 
    
-0.068** -0.327***   
     
(0.029) (0.105)   
COV 
    
13.233 3.742   
 
    
(11.295) (12.299)   
COV*UD*Lay 
Off_Bench      
0.010***   
 
     
(0.003)   
PMR       -0.155 -0.164 
       (0.119) (0.120) 
Employees/Tot.empl.        14.538* 
        (8.317) 
Country*Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Sector dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Obs. 1284 1284 1284 1284 1284 1284 1284 1284 
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Table 7: Employment protection of temporary contracts and employment- diff in diff estimates 
	  
Dependent variable: Ln(Employment) 
Explanatory variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
EPLT *  TWS_Bench 
 
-1.503** -1.517** -1.565** -1.502** -1.601** -1.553** -1.199** 
  
(0.642) (0.642) (0.642) (0.646) (0.652) (0.645) (0.594) 
EPLT 274.931*** 287.926*** 288.235*** 293.275*** 419.935 826.187 294.196*** 249.804*** 
 (5.106) (7.731) (24.287) (25.729) (1085.858) (1158.555) (25.815) (20.259) 
Capital/output ratio -1.805 -2.368** -2.520** -2.853** -2.487** -3.164** -2.938** -0.87 
 (1.162) (1.202) (1.205) (1.224) (1.209) (1.266) (1.222) (1.085) 
EPLR *  Lay Off_Bench   3.718** 4.894*** 3.631** 4.064* 4.820*** 4.128*** 
   (1.624) (1.550) (1.719) (2.181) (1.579) (1.314) 
EPLR   -14.484 -13.862 -1.5496 -3.481 -3.779 2.337 
   (14.194) (16.511) (17.236) (18.334) (16.460) (13.469) 
UD * Lay Off_Bench 
 
  0.141***  -0.649 0.141*** 0.139*** 
  
  (0.027)  (0.681) (0.027) (0.024) 
UD    -1.121  -1.636 -1.157 -2.653** 
    (1.123)  (1.201) (1.126) (1.036) 
COV* Lay Off_Bench 
    
-2.105 -6.779   
     
(0.035) (0.295)   
COV 
    
0.035 -0.295   
 
    
(0.001) (0.213)   
COV*UD*Lay Off_Bench 
     
0.009   
 
     
(0.700)   
PMR       0.069 -0.038 
       (0.241) (0.201) 
Employees/Tot.employmen
t        172.787*** 
        (12.437) 
Country*Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Sector dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Obs. 1284 1284 1284 1284 1284 1284 1284 1284 
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Table 8: Endogeneity tests, IV estimates with Two steps GMM estimator   
Dependent variables Labour Share Ln(Employment) Ln(Wages) 
Explanatory variables       
EPLT *TWSBench 0.475*** 0.532*** -1.602*** -1.767*** 0.746*** 0.879*** 
 
(0.164) (0.188) (0.486) (0.571) (0.249) (0.292) 
Capital/output ratio -0.900*** -0.914*** -2.335*** -1.911** -5.610*** -5.810*** 
 (0.273) (0.282) (0.862) (0.880) (0.529) (0.544) 
EPLT -8.064**  -159.89***  -3.001  
 (3.443)  (12.142)  (9.015)  
Country*Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes Yes 
Sector dummies yes yes yes yes yes Yes 
Underidentification Test _ p value 
(Kleibergen-Paap rk LM Statistic) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
       
Weak Identification Test _ Wald 
F Stat. 
(Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 
Satistic) 
5781.42 712.47 5781.42 712.47 5781.42 387.019 
Overidentification Test _ p value 
(Hansen J Statistic) 0.656 0,984 0.478 0.323 0.098 0.048 
       
Endogeneity test of 
EPLTxTWSBench_ 
(p-value) 
 0,942  0.496  0.258 
Endogeneity test of Capital/output 
ratio (p_value) 0.831  0.331  0.019  
Obs. 1177 1070 1177 1070 1177 1070 
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APPENDIX 
TABLE A1:  DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES 
LS Labour share (sectoral-country data) Source: EU KLEMS database 
Comp 
Compensation of employees (including wages and salaries and all other 
costs of employing labour which are borne by the employer) 
Source: EU KLEMS database 
 
 Empl Number of dependent employees  Source: EU KLEMS database 
TE Number of dependent employees and self employed employees Source: EU KLEMS database 
EPLT  
Employment protection of temporary workers (fixed-term and 
temporary employment) 
Source: OECD 
EPLR 
 
Employment protection of  regular workers against individual 
dismissal 
Source: OECD  
UD 
Union density rates (the share of union members in the employed 
dependent labour force 
Source: Visser (2011) 
COV Share of employees covered by wage bargaining agreements Source: Visser (2011) 
TWS_BENCH 
Share of Temporary Contracts (fixed-term and temporary 
employment): sectoral-country data.  
Source: EUROSTAT 
 
LO_BENCH Lay-off rates: UK  Source: Quarterly Labour Force surveys, UK 
PMR Product  Market Regulation  Source: OECD 
CAPITAL TO 
OUTPUT RAIO 
K/Y 
Capital –to output ratio (sectoral-country data) 
 Source: EU KLEMS 
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Figure 1: Adjusted and non  adjusted labour shares in European countries, total industries of 
the market economy, 1995—2007  
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Figure 2: Labour share changes: in 14 EU economies: 1995-2201 and 2002-2007  
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Figure 3: Labour share comparisons by sectors in 14 European economies:: 1995-2007  
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Figure 4: Shift and Share decomposition of labour share changes in 14 European economies 
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Figure 5: Employment protection of temporary and regular contracts  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
